Myths and Misunderstandings by Meyerson, Michael I.
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law




University of Baltimore School of Law, mmeyerson@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation




The development of a body of law for a new communications
techology is an odd experience for American jurisprudence. Stare
decisis is designed to ensure that both common law and constitutional
law develop sequentially, with principles of the past adopted, and
adapted, for current usages. Peculiarly, even though we have but one
First Amendment, there has long been recognition that the principles
that are bedrock for one medium are irrelevant to another.
The clearest statement of this concept came in Metromedia,
Inc. v. San Diego when the Supreme Court stated, "Each method of
communicating ideas is a law unto itself and that law must reflect the
differing natures, values, abuses and dangers of each method."' The
problem, of course, is how to discern this "law unto itself' for any
particular form of communication.
Cable television has been in existence for four decades and
there is not yet a consensus, or definitive Supreme Court opinion,
elucidating cable's "law." Advocates, scholars and judges always begin
with a search for analogies to pre-existing technologies. Those in favor
of governmental regulation compared cable television to that other
form of television, broadcast television, in the hope that the relative
ease with which broadcast regulations were traditionally upheld
would rub off on cable. Those opposed to regulation compared cable
to the most protected form of communication, the print medium, and
tried to use the concept of an "electronic newspaper" to create a
constitutional shield against governmental intervention.
When finally faced with the question of whether cable was
"like a broadcaster" or "like a newspaper," the Supreme Court
managed the seemingly difficult feat of further confusing the issue. In
City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.,2 the Court
acknowledged that the operation of a cable system did "implicate First
Amendment interests." On the critical question of how cable impli-
cates the First Amendment and what standard should be used for
judging the constitutionality of regulation, the Court punted, stating
that cable was like a newspaper and like a broadcaster:
Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of
speech and the communication of ideas as do the
traditional enterprises of newspaper and book
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publishers, public speakers and pamphleteers.
[Preferred's] proposed activities would seem to
implicate First Amendment interests as do the
activities of wireless broadcasters....
These two sentences are, in a legal sense, contradictory.
Because the print and broadcast media have such different standards
for regulation, it is unedifying to say that the newer technology
resembles both. Perhaps the more helpful language comes from the
concurring opinion in Preferred, in which Justices Blackmun, Marshall
and O'Connor stressed that the Court had "left open the question of
the proper standard" for analyzing cable television. The three Justices
presented the possibility that no analogy to other forms of
communication may prove to be appropriate and that the characteris-
tics of cable television may, "require a new analysis."
With this opening, comes a new question: which timeless
principles should be used to create the new analysis? Unfortunately,
the myths that have grown around certain classic First Amendment
cases make this formidable task even more difficult.
For example, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,3 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine as
applied to broadcasters. When a similar, though not identical, "right of
reply" for newspapers was struck down five years later in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. vs. Tornillo,4 the dichotomy between broadcast-
ing and the print medium was constitutionalized. In countless articles
and briefs discussing cable television's location in this dichotomy, the
"holding" of Red Lion has been red lined to the simple test that only
media with a "spectrum scarcity" are subject to governmental
regulation. "Economic scarcity," though, because it also affects
newspapers, is deemed insufficient to permit governmental regula-
tion, even if it creates a limit on the voices in a community.
One of the more blatant misuses of this distinction is by
those who argue that there is no scarcity in cable television because
the cable can offer 100 channels, while broadcasters have a far more
limited number of channels available. The fallacy here is that the
"scarcity" of cable lies in the number of gatekeepers not in the
number of speakers the gatekeeper lets through. As long as there is
only one cable operator, there is a scarcity in that most critical
function, the selection of the programming. Even in those rare
communities with two cable operators, at least temporarily, the
existence of two bottlenecks hardly bespeaks the end of scarcity.
There is also something misleading about basing the
discussion on "scarcity" at all. Such an analysis ignores the last section
of Red Lion, Section III E. (arguably one of the least read sections of
any landmark decision). This part of the Court's opinion was meant to
-120
answer the argument, made in 1969, that scarcity was a problem of the
past. First, the Court noted there continued to be more uses for the
spectrum that it could accommodate and that "wise planning is
essential." Then, the Court held that, even where there is empty
spectrum space, regulation is still permissible.
The reason that even broadcasters operating in an environ-
ment free from spectrum scarcity can still be subject to Fairness-type
regulation is that the existing broadcasters have an unnatural
advantage over potential competitors due to the original assistance of
the government. The three networks do not control a majority of the
viewing eyes due to mere survival of the fittest; they are special
beneficiaries of governmental largesse:
Even where there are gaps in spectrum utilization,
the fact remains that existing broadcasters have often
attained their present position because of their
initial government selection in competition with
others ... Long experience in broadcasting, con-
firmed habits of listeners and viewers, network
affiliation, and other advantages in program procure-
ment give existing broadcasters a substantial advan-
tage over new entrants, even where new entry is tech-
nologically possible. These advantages are the fruit
of a preferred position conferred by government
Thus, the analysis of cable's place in the legal spectrum
should not be limited by an analysis of why cable is "scarce." Rather,
the appropriate question is whether existing cable operators are
beneficiaries of "the fruit of a preferred position conferred by
government."
The vast majority of the more than 2500 cable operators are
enjoying a governmentally-granted, governmentally-protected mon-
opoly. Even if those who argue that cable is a "natural monopoly" are
correct, so that the monopoly situation cannot fairly be called the
handiwork of government, it is unmistakable that the monopolist was
selected by the governmental franchising process. The primary benefit
of governmental license to use public rights-of-way does not exhaust
the benefits utilized by the cable operators. Compulsory licenses and
mandated pole attachment rates have further assisted the cable
operators in their communications business.
Thus, governmental assistance, rather than "physical vs.
economic" scarcity, lies at the heart of the broadcast/newspaper
dichotomy. Where newspapers have become powerful due to their
own abilities, government has no claim. But where newspapers are
assisted by governmental actions, like the Newspaper Preservation
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Act,' otherwise inconceivable governmental regulation becomes
acceptable.
The Newspaper Preservation Act grants papers an exemption
from antitrust liability, permitting competing newspapers to combine
their publishing and business functions if one is in "probable danger
of financial failure." If they do combine, the papers must keep their
editorial and reporting staffs separate. Now, when else can
government tell a newspaper editor which reporter she is barred from
using? Only because government has provided assistance is such
regulation permitted. In sum, courts and commentators seem to agree
that where government has provided an anti-competitive benefit to a
speaker, government is then permitted to impose content-neutral
regulations that increase the diversity of voices.6
For cable television, the most important content-neutral
regulation designed to increase the diversity of voices are public and
leased access provisions that permit programmers unaffiliated with the
cable operator to offer programs over the cable system. Those who
oppose this form of regulation rely on a myth about another case,
Buckley v. Valeo.7 In striking down a provision of the Federal Election
Campaign Act which limited personal annual expenditure on behalf of
a candidate, the Supreme Court dismissed the argument that there was
a governmental interest in "equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections ...
[T] he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... "8
Some have tried to use this reasoning to argue that there is
no governmental interest in promoting diversity of expression:
Thus the Court recognized that it is not government's
role to suppress the speech or speech-related
activities of one individual or group in order to
foster the ability of others to speak. As a result, no
compelling interest can be based on such a goal,
because the goal is antithetical to the First
Amendment.9
The fallacy in this argument is that the Court recognized no
such thing. The key concept in the condemnation of restricting one
party's speech "in order to enhance the relative voice of others" is
found in the phrase "relative voice." There was no increase in the
volume or frequency of the voices that were intended to be aided. The
constitutional sin in Buckley was that the goal and effect of the
limitation on expenditure was to reduce the total amount of speech
presented. The lessening of discussion is what was antithetical to the
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First Amendment. By contrast, the Supreme Court has willingly
permitted the government to "suppress the ... speech-related activi-
ties of ... one group in order to foster the ability of others to speak,"
by upholding a ban on newspaper acquisition of co-located broadcast
licenses and a ban on A.T.&T.'s entry into electronic publishing.10 The
difference was that in the two cases where the restrictions were
upheld the net effect of the regulation was more speech with more
voices. Rather than being antithetical to the First Amendment, such an
increase furthers the marketplace of ideas.
Unfortunately, even the Holmesian marketplace of ideas is
not free from misuse at the hands of our precedential myth-makers.
For it is the marketplace of Adam Smith that is the model for this line
of reasoning, promising an invisible hand to pen messages we need.
The problem however, is that the marketplace of ideas does not work
in the same way as the marketplace for goods. There is no great
danger to society if four cereal makers produce the vast majority of
cereal consumed each morning. One need not be intuitively troubled
that the same manufacturer is producing a highly-sweetened,
chocolate confection for children to eat at breakfast and a high-
protein, high-fiber, all-natural health fix for their parents.
By contrast, the domination of mass communications by a
handful of editorial decision-makers would be more than a little
troubling. We would not trust one editor accurately and competently
to present the range of views from the radical left to the radical right
and back to the middle again. As John Stuart Mill argued:
It is not enough that [a person] should hear the
arguments of adversaries from his own teachers,
presented as they state them, and accompanied by
what they offer as refutations. This is not the way to
do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real
contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear
them from persons who actually believe them: who
defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for
them."
The ability to hear the enormous range of diverse opinions
presented by those who actually believe them is made possible by
cable television. The generous channel capacity permits a range of
voices never before available through electronic mass communication.
In creating a legal doctrine for analyzing governmental regulation of
cable television, respect must be given to the centuries-old goals of
the First Amendment. Content-neutral, pro-diversity regulation must
be permitted and encouraged, else later generations will be
bemoaning "the myth of freedom of expression."
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